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Abstract Epigenetics is one of the most rapidly expanding fields in the life sciences. Its rise is
frequently framed as a revolutionary turn that heralds a new epoch both for gene-based episte-
mology and for the wider discourse on life that pervades knowledge-intensive societies of the
molecular age. The fundamentals of this revolution remain however to be scrutinized, and indeed
the very contours of what counts as ‘epigenetic’ are often blurred. This is reflected also in the
mounting discourse on the societal implications of epigenetics, in which vast expectations coexist
with significant uncertainty about what aspects of this science are most relevant for politics or
policy alike. This is therefore a suitable time to reflect on the directions that social theory could
most productively take in the scrutiny of this revolution. Here we take this opportunity in both its
scholarly and normative dimension, that is, proposing a roadmap for social theorizing on epige-
netics that does not shy away from, and indeed hopefully guides, the framing of its most socially
relevant outputs. To this end, we start with an epistemological reappraisal of epigenetic discourse
that valorizes the blurring of meanings as a critical asset for the field and privileged analytical entry
point. We then propose three paths of investigation. The first looks at the structuring elements of
controversies and visions around epigenetics. The second probes the mutual constitution between
the epigenetic reordering of living phenomena and the normative settlements that orient indivi-
dual and collective responsibilities. The third highlights the material import of epigenetics and the
molecularization of culture that it mediates. We suggest that these complementary strands provide
both an epistemically and socially self-reflective framework to advance the study of epigenetics as
a molecular juncture between nature and nurture and thus as the new critical frontier in the social
studies of the life sciences.
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Who you are is written in both pen and pencil:
things written in pen you can’t change: that’s DNA;
but things written in pencil, you can: that’s epigenetics.
(Reliv International, promoting the soy peptide extract, LunaRich X™)
Succeeding by Blurring: The Irresistible Rise of Molecular
Epigenetics
Molecular epigenetics, the ‘next big thing’ in the world of bioscience (Ebrahim, 2012), is a
scientific success story that thrives in the ambiguity of its own definition. As to success, there
can be little doubt about it: it is enough to look at the 10-fold increase, over the last decade, in
the number of publications carrying ‘epigenetic’ in their title (Haig, 2012). Only in 2011 the
figure of publications in the field had reached the astonishing amount of several thousands,
possibly up to 20 000 depending on the search criteria (Jirtle, 2012), and at any rate has
continued to increase since then. Similar efforts aimed at computing the rise of epigenetics in
terms of new networks, institutes, conferences, curricula and journals confirm the vertical
growth of the field across the full range of academic indicators.
Within a few years ambitious large-scale projects, such as the International Human Epigenome
Consortium (IHEC) or the NIHRoadmap EpigenomicsMapping Consortium, aiming at mapping
human epigenomes for a variety of cell types and/or disease states, have been launched worldwide.
New journals (Epigenetics, Epigenetics and Chromatin, Clinical Epigenetics), professional bodies
(the Epigenetic Society, the Clinical Epigenetics Society) and research centers have also appeared in
just a decade. In sum, epigenetics has provided “a banner under which a new scientific movement
has advanced” (Haig, 2012, p. 15). Even beyond the boundaries of biomedicine, various other
disciplines have started to signal the impact of epigenetics on some of their fundamental tenets:
from bioethics (Dupras et al, 2012) to human geography (Guthman and Mansfield, 2013), from
political (Hedlund, 2012) to legal theory (Rothstein et al, 2009), from epidemiology (Relton and
Davey Smith, 2012) to the philosophy of identity (Boniolo and Testa, 2011).
Unsurprisingly, even a cursory glimpse into popular media reveals the increasing stronghold
of epigenetics also on public imaginary. Epigenetics has gone pop (Davey Smith, 2012)
occupying the cover of global magazines under sensationalist claims such as “victory over the
gene” (Der Spiegel, 2010) or “your DNA isn’t your destiny” (Time Magazine; see Cloud,
2010). Holistic medicine and various spiritual advices are being reframed in epigenetic terms
(Church, 2007). Perhaps unsurprisingly, a new market niche has also started to emerge with
companies spinning the business potential of the epigenetic idiom, as exemplified in the case of
Reliv International, a producer of nutritional supplements, that launched its latest soy extract
under the banner “You to SuperYou: Direct Your DNA Naturally Through Nutritional
Epigenetics” (reliv.com/lunasin-and-epigenetics).
An Epistemology of the Imprecise
Precisely as a field, however, epigenetics seems to flourish in the remarkable ambiguity of its
defining term, with its apparent ability to accommodate – and productively align – a rather
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diverse range of biological questions and epistemic stances. Echoing Rheinberger’s (2003)
endorsement for an ‘epistemology of the imprecise’, we argue that the ability to entertain
multiple understandings of what constitute epigenetic phenomena, and hence multiple ways to
secure epigenetic evidence, is foundational to epigenetics’ rise, both as a scientific discipline
and as a popular phenomenon. Expanding on the notion of ‘boundary object’ (Star and
Griesemer, 1989), Rheinberger (2003) framed the gene as a boundary object that molecular
biology has been gradually encasing within an eminently flexible boundary concept, thus
supporting the claim that ‘boundary objects require boundary concepts’ because, “as long as
the objects of research are in flux, the corresponding concepts must remain in flux, too”. The
same we believe applies today to epigenetics, with its elusiveness (Dupré, 2012), polysemantic
nature (Morange, 2002, p. 56) and coexistence of multiple accepted meanings for some of its
basic features (Haig, 2004; see also Bird, 2007 and Ptashne, 2007).
In what follows, we thus start out not with the aim to provide a full disambiguation of
epigenetics (including its more recent – omic descendant epigenomics, in which epigenetic
regulation is studied at the level of the entire genome), as this would be at this stage largely futile
and indeed counterproductive. Rather, we find it useful to trace the contours of this eminently
flexible concept (epigenetic) and of the versatile fields that its flexibility propels. Specifically, our
first goal is to highlight some key junctures at which the diverse streams of epigenetic research
collide as well as the main knots through which they become entangled or conflated. The reason
is that these instances of epistemic blurring open for social theory unique entry points to engage
with the potentially transforming aspects of this burgeoning field.
Sources and Boundaries of Epigenetics
Epigenetics has a long history in biology, and its current molecular reconfiguration is the
result of a series of conceptual and experimental shifts. The notion of epigenetics was first
coined by embryologist and developmental biologist C. H. Waddington (1905–1975) in
the 1940s to define in a broader non-molecular sense the “whole complex of develop-
mental processes” that connects genotype and phenotype. “It is convenient to have a name
for this complex” Waddington writes, and “ ‘epigenotype’ seems suitable” (reprinted in
Waddington, 2012). Note as an aside that the neologism epigenetics was coined by
Waddington as a derivative of epigenesis (Van Speybroeck, 2002), that is in a developmental
sense, and was not meant in the current popular sense of what goes beyond/upon (epi – in
Greek) the gene.
A second parallel origin of the concept seems to have had a stronger influence on the present
understanding. This second tradition originates with Nanney’s (1958) paper, Epigenetic
Control Systems, and refers more specifically to the expression of genetic sequences (Haig,
2012; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). As Haig explains, in Nanney epigenetic control refers to
“which volume in the library of genetic specificities was to be expressed in a particular cell”. It
is this second, more squarely molecular meaning that resonates to a greater extent with
contemporary practices and that we refer to as ‘molecular epigenetics’ to differentiate it from
the original, developmentally centered and broader Waddingtonian sense (see for a distinc-
tion, Griffiths and Stotz, 2013). In turn this ‘library-scanning’ view is itself broad enough to
accommodate two only partially overlapping meanings of molecular epigenetics.
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On the one hand, in fact, the library analogy forms the backbone for today’s broader – and
in some respects more shallow – understanding of molecular epigenetic, where the ‘epi’ has
come to refer to virtually all levels of cellular function that overlay genes while representing
the result – or indeed the cause – of their differential expression in different cells and/or in
different conditions. This operational definition includes the full complement of chromatin
(that is, the three-dimensional mesh of structural and regulatory proteins within which most
DNA metabolism takes place) but also the transcriptome, the proteome and the various
omic – slices into which life’s complexity has come to be parsed along the biochemical
classification of its constituent molecules. In this sense, Nanney’s definition, at its broadest,
translates epigenetics into a problem, or rather into the problem of gene expression, and
depending on the level at which one chooses to analyze the latter, the former becomes more or
less distant from its original physical link to the genome.
The second, more precise and demanding meaning in molecular epigenetics involves
operational definitions that are mostly negative, as in the study of “any long-term change in
gene function that persists even when the initial trigger is long gone that does not involve a
change in gene sequence or structure” (McGowan and Szyf, 2010, p. 67 our italics), or of a
“phenotypic variation that is not attributable to genetic variation” (Champagne, 2010,
p. 300), or of that portion of phenotypes that is transmitted though cell division or organismal
reproduction but that is not encoded in DNA. In all evidence, we are still fully within the
library analogy, except that now the only volumes that count are those that remain open long
after the first reader is done with them.
It is apparent that both meanings of epigenetic deflate the role of genes as causally privileged
determinants of phenotypes, the former by emphasizing the regulatory context that extracts
diverse functional outputs from the same genome, the latter by highlighting those instances in
which non-genetic changes persist, either in time or in space or in both. Viewed from this
angle, both strands of epigenetic thinking and experimenting are contributing to a style of
thought that, following in particular Griffiths and Stotz (2013), we can define as postgenomic.
In the
postgenomic era, when complete genome sequences are available for an increasing
range of organisms, the range of molecular actors has expanded greatly. The genome is
not merely a collection of genes, but houses diverse other functional elements. Genes no
longer have a single function closely related to their structure, but respond in a flexible
manner to signals from a massive regulatory architecture that is, increasingly, the real
focus of research in ‘genetics’.
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2013, p. 2)
Importantly, here postgenomic and postgenomics are meant not only chronologically (that
is, what has happened after/post the deciphering of the Human Genome in 2003) but also
epistemologically, as the recognition of those gaps in knowledge and unforeseen complexities
surrounding the gene (Maher, 2008) that have made our understanding of its function
cautiously provisional and perennially contingent.
Increasingly, it is under the overarching umbrella of epigenetics (in the first, more shallow
meaning that we have sketched above) that the disentanglement of these new complexities is
expected to take place, promoting a conflation of the epigenetic with the postgenomic around
the context-dependent view of the gene (Keller, 2000; Oyama et al, 2001; Moss, 2003;
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Robert, 2004; Mameli, 2005; Morange, 2006; Stotz, 2006, 2008; Stotz et al, 2006; Griffiths
and Stotz, 2007, 2013; Nowotny and Testa, 2011). In this contextual view, genes are
addressed as “catalysts” more than “codes” (Elman et al, 1996), “followers” rather than
“leaders” (West-Eberhard, 2003), “embedded inside cells and their complex chemical
environments” that are, in turn, embedded in organs, systems and societies (Lewkowicz,
2011). As Meaney emblematically writes:
the function of the gene can only be fully understood in terms of the cellular
environment in which it operates. And the cellular environment, of course, is dynamic,
changing constantly as a result of signals from other cells, including those that derive
from events occurring in the external environment. Ultimately, function can only
be understood in terms of the interaction between environmental signals and the
genome.
(2010, p. 48)
Expectedly, this way of thinking about biological processes has major consequences for
established dichotomies of twentieth century biosciences, and in particular for the genotype/
phenotype distinction (coined by Johannsen in the 1910s). In the context of the gene-centrism
of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the relationship between genotype and phenotype was
typically thought of as a relationship between a cause and its visible and mechanistically
deduced effects, “between a plan and a product” (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005, p. 33). In that
theoretical framework the chain of causal links moved unidirectionally from the active
genotype to the ‘dead-end’ phenotype. In the postgenomic era, instead, the relationship
between genotype and phenotype is more often represented, rather than as a linear causal
chain, in terms of a “rope” (Griesemer, 2002), a term that wishes to capture the profound
intertwinement of the actual genetic material with the various layers of its phenotypic
“appearance” (Oyama et al, 2001). Surfing over this rope, epigenetics resumes its original
Waddingtonian emphasis, becoming a convenient heading for the multiple strands and
complex apparatus of “developmental transformations intervening between genotype and
phenotype” (Pigliucci and Muller, 2010, p. 308, our italics; see also Schlichting, and Pigliucci,
1998; Robert, 2004; Hallgrímsson and Hall, 2011).
Pulling together the threads of these imbricated, blurred or at times frankly compe-
ting understandings of epigenetics, we can thus posit that its current and unifying thrust
is, in a nutshell, the promise to capture the analogical vastness of the ‘environmental
signals’ recounted above through the digital representation of their molecular responses.
If what seemed irreducibly analogic (the social, the environmental, the biographical,
the idiosyncratically human) needs to be overlaid onto the digital genome of the informa-
tionally ripe age in a dyadic flow of reciprocal reactivity, then it seems that this overlay
can succeed only once the analogic is interrogated, parsed and cast into genome-friendly,
code-compatible digital representations (RNA, DNA found associated to specific chromatin
modifications as in chromatin immunoprecipitation or ChIP, methylated DNAs etc.). In this
respect, epigenomic profiles (transcriptomes, chromatin maps and the further bits of
living matter that technology is progressively digitizing, from proteomes to metabolomes
etc.) are increasingly fulfilling, in today’s biology, the role that cellular lineages took on
in what Morange refers to as the ‘crisis of molecular biology’ in the 1970s and 1980s.
Following the spectacular dissection of the genetic code, the challenge to explain development
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in equally molecular and code-compatible terms proved rapidly a major one. As Morange
notes,
The roots of the crisis should be sought at the epistemological level: what molecular
biologists cruelly lacked, what led them to a feeling of decadence, was the total absence of a
definition of…what would be an explanation of development, [… for this… ] required
that another level of description of the biological facts not be discovered,
but valorized. This level was the cellular level, and this explains the dramatic
development of cell biology during these years. Cell biology provided what Harold
Kincaid called the ‘place holders’, the terms which are introduced to designate an
entity, a process for which we have good evidence, but whose precise nature is
unknown.
(Morange 1997, p. 390)
Similarly, we argue that epigenomic profiles, in their expanding variety, provide the new
place holders to anchor the environment to the genome and enable the attending analogic–
digital translations, conceptually as much as experimentally.
Thus, having briefly mapped the blurred and thereby productive boundaries of today’s
epigenetics, we move now to explore three research pathways for an emerging field of
‘epigenetics and society’: (i) epigenetic vistas across controversies, hypes and sociotechnical
imaginaries; (ii) epigenetics between facts and concerns; (iii) the emergence of a new molecular
materialism mediated by the instruments and classifications of epigenetic research. Recent
studies have begun to chart the contours of the new social studies of epigenetics, from an
inquiry into the attitudes of epigenetics researchers (Tolwinski, 2013) to an articulate
endorsement of the possible types of engagement between epigenetics and the social sciences,
ranging from the more ‘interventionist’ to the more ‘self-reflexive’ streams of Science and
Technology Studies (STS) (Pickersgill et al, 2013).
Here we advance this agenda further by providing three critical elements: (i) a methodolo-
gical anchor to the epistemology of the imprecise, which positions epigenetics vis-a-vis both its
scientific antecedents (chiefly molecular genetics) and its prospective partner disciplines within
the social sciences; (ii) a focus on the digital feature of current epigenetics as a key resource
to trace its explanatory success, again vis-a-vis its antecedents and prospective partners; and
(iii) a tripartite research program that should hopefully foster the exercise of a rigorous
‘political-epistemology’, for which the focus on epigenetics provides a paradigm of the
inherently socio-political nature of biological discourse.
Pathway 1: Epigenetic vistas across controversies, hypes and sociotechnical
imaginaries
The very notions of a “decade of the epigenome” (Martens et al, 2011) or even of an “era of
epigenetics” (Hurd, 2010) reveal how rapidly epigenetics has been rising to that level of
salience, in both scientific and societal imaginary, that warrants the dedication of defined
timescales in public attention and investment. And despite the fact that this ‘decade’ has just
begun, it is not too early to reflect on the societal impact of epigenetics. As we have already
seen in the past for genetics, neuroscience or stem cells, often pioneering but preliminary
findings are construed as providing evidence upon which to draw consequences for human
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health and well-being, especially by policymakers, media commentators, life-style advisers
and sometimes natural and social scientists themselves.
Indeed, there is the feeling that is already happening for epigenetics: in popular books
epigenetics has already been employed to make claims about human talent (Shenk, 2010), and
in scientific articles epigenetic markers have been used to make claims about social inequalities
and race differences in health (Kuzawa and Sweet, 2009; Wells, 2010; McGuinness et al, 2012).
In triangulation with findings from the Developmental Origin of Health and Disease (DOHaD)
literature, epigenetic claims have been used to target mothers as a new center of responsibility
(Paul, 2010), recasting the maternal body into a sort of “epigenetic vector” (Richardson,
forthcoming). Other expectations, as we will review later, exist with regard to epigenetics
providing a possible new ground for legal claims and extended notions of responsibility.
A social study of epigenetics therefore should start from a reflexive analysis of the way in
which epigenetic knowledge is becoming “a social phenomenon in itself” (Landecker and
Panofsky, 2013), including the imaginaries and visions that are catalyzing this transition, and
that we will refer to here as epigenetic imagination. Its analysis will provide social scientists
with a vast repertoire of empirical sources where to observe the full thickness of science and
society interactions through three of the most flourishing streams of research in Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and STS: (1a) the sociology of scientific controversies; (1b) the
sociology of hypes and expectations; (1c) the emergence of sociotechnical imaginaries.
Controversial knowledge
The study of scientific controversies has been a key heuristic methodology in SSK and STS for
more than three decades now, prompting analysts to focus on the way in which scientific
disagreement is handled, on the resources and practices that allow disputes to arise and persist,
and finally on the decisional mechanisms by which consensus is reached (Nelkin, 1979, 1992;
Engelhardt et al, 1987; Brante et al, 1993; Martin and Richards, 1995; Roosth and Silbey,
2009; Martin, 2008). Precisely through the blurred and at times frankly competing epistemol-
ogies that underpin the classification of its phenomena, epigenetics offers no shortage of contro-
versies, especially around the following themes: (i) the relevance of intergenerational inheritance
of epigenetic traits especially in higher organisms; (ii) the reappraisal of the concept of gene, and
of the assessment of its functional significance, in the light of the unforeseen extent of several
epi-layers of regulation (as most vividly captured in the heated controversies over the universe of
non-coding RNAs unearthed by the ENCODE Project (Doolittle, 2013; Graur et al, 2013));
(iii) the tension between the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis as a settled canon and the renewed
interest, much more vocal than in the past, in epigenetic, neo-Lamarckian mechanisms of inheri-
tance (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005); and (iv) the epigenetic underpinnings of human behaviors.
Here we briefly focus on two such controversies whose implications appear particularly far-
reaching for the strands of sociological inquiry that we pursue in this work.
The first is a display of semantic tension more than an actual controversy, but illustrates
nicely the contentious potential of the blurring that we have previously hailed as a key factor
in epigenetics’ success and the ambiguity of the epistemic space in which epigenetics prospers
today. In a recent popular publication Eric Nestler, Director of the Friedman Brain Institute at
the Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York and co-author of a very much quoted study on
the epigenetics of psychiatric disorders (Tsankova et al, 2007), expresses caution on the
potential of epigenetics by claiming that “much more work is therefore needed before we will
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know the extent to which epigenetic mechanisms represent a third factor – beyond nature and
nurture – in controlling an individual’s traits in health and disease” (Nestler, 2013).
For Sweatt (2013) instead, one of the leaders of the emerging field of neuroepigenetics, “it is
now clear that there is a dynamic interplay between genes and experience, a clearly delineated
and biochemically driven mechanistic interface between nature and nurture. That mechanistic
interface is epigenetics” (p. 624). The point here, however, is not so much about caution
versus optimism. Rather, what counts for us is the radically distinct epistemic space in which
epigenetics is recruited as an explanatory resource, by two authors who are both authorities in
their field and have recently coedited an important publication on the epigenetics of regulation
of the nervous system (Sweatt et al, 2013).
In what Keller (2010) has defined as the mirage of a space between nature and nurture,
Nestler posits epigenetic mechanisms as a third factor that reaches beyond both, whereas
Sweatt sees them as the interface that obliterates the space and dispels the mirage. ‘Beyond’
versus ‘between’: there lies the difference it would seem, and indeed it will be interesting for the
analyst to see whether such semantic tensions end up propelling fundamental theoretical or
experimental distinctions, or whether they will remain as just the rather innocuous legacy of
that systematic blurring we have outlined above. In other words, it is conceivable that if
epigenetic mechanisms are framed as distinct from both nature (a proxy for genes in such
discourses) and nurture (a proxy for environmental triggers), rather than as the lens that
illuminates the former through the latter (and vice versa) the very questions that end up being
asked may well differ significantly, and with them also the host of attending experimental
systems.
The second controversy concerns the difficulty in establishing the existence and relevance of
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in humans. Predisposition to colorectal cancer can be
inherited through genetic mutations in several genes, including MutL homolog 1, colon
cancer, nonpolyposis type 2 (MLH1) and MutS protein homolog 2 (MSH2). Some cases,
however, were found to be inherited through epimutations in these two genes, that is to say in
the abnormal methylation that ablated their function despite the integrity of their sequence,
and they initially constituted the most striking example, documented in molecular detail, of
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in humans (Chan et al, 2006). Subsequent scrutiny,
however, revealed that MSH2 methylation (the epimutation) was due to a genetic mutation in
a neighboring gene (Ligtenberg et al, 2009). And also for MLH1, while the jury is still out, it is
proving difficult to rule out upstream genetic causes and to unequivocally establish that the
epimutation is itself inherited through the gametes rather than being simply triggered right
after fertilization (Daxinger and Whitelaw, 2012).
Beyond the details of these fascinating cases, what emerges is the problem associated with
the depth and breadth of the molecular gaze that informs current biology, with its sky-
rocketing ability to reveal more and more minute details but also with the attending challenge
to define thresholds of epistemic significance for each of them (Nowotny and Testa, 2011).
For in the age of so-called next generation sequencing (the term itself a testimony to the open-
endedness of the whole pursuit), with genomes and epigenomes stretching like acres of naked
nucleotides ready to be read and re-read with ever greater accuracy, proving a transgenera-
tional epigenetic effect in the outbred human population, requires de facto that all possible
genomic causes are excluded. And yet, the vaster the genomic space we wish to sample to that
end and the more certain we wish to be of that exclusion, the digger we have to deep. Thus,
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these controversies are paradigmatic because they set the stage for probing, in the many
similar cases that will undoubtedly follow, what comes to constitute epigenetic evidence in the
first place, through which work of purification and through which ‘trial of strength’ (Latour,
1999), be it material or statistical.
Orthogonally to this peer-to-peer debate among scientists, a second source of friction is
already well-identifiable in the tension between the supposed consensus around epigenetic
knowledge, as it is propagated in society, in the front page headlines and also in some social
science literature, and its uncertain, speculative status within the scientific community itself. It
is in this mismatch between what is established and what is at present a source of heated
scientific dispute that speculative assumptions, inflated discourses and enthusiastic media
promotion, in a word all that create hypes around the epigenetic imaginary, are likely to find
fertile ground. This brings us to the second point, the visions and expectations generated by
epigenetic knowledge as it circulates through society.
Cycles of hypes and expectations from the genome to the epigenome and back
As a test case for the sociology of expectations, epigenetic knowledge is also very well-
positioned. A growing body of research over the last years has investigated the forward-
looking dynamics of science and technologies and the ‘generative’ role of expectations in
“guiding activities, providing structure and legitimation, attracting interest and fostering
investment” (Borup et al, 2006, p. 286; see also, Brown et al, 2000; Brown and Michael,
2003; Van Lente, 1993, 2012). Although expectations have always been important in the
modern history of science and technology, this stream of research has emphasized how
“hyperbolic expectations about the future have become more significant or intense in late and
advanced industrial modernity” (Borup et al, 2006). This saturation with anticipations,
visions and promises has already accompanied the rise of genomics (Hedgecoe and Martin
2003; Fortun 2005; Sunder Rajan, 2006; Martin et al, 2008; Tutton, 2011) and it is against
this backdrop that we wish to situate the current climax of expectations surrounding
epigenomics. Specifically, we find that the hypes accompanying epigenomics, mainly at the
level of popular science but also in sections of the scientific community, rest on a bivalent
understanding of its relationship with genomics: on the one hand as a missing link that can
succeed where genomics purportedly failed, on the other as a quantum leap enabled by the
very success of genomics. This is because epigenomics, as we briefly summarize below, is
exploding at a specific and highly interesting phase in the cycle of expectations and promises
of genomics itself (for the literature on hype cycles, Van Lente et al, 2013).
Following the relative disappointment for the slow pace of translation of genomic knowl-
edge into clinical practice, genomics is in fact experiencing now a major come back driven
largely by the unprecedented leap in our ability to sequence individual genomes. In a nutshell
we can say that the newly found confidence in the genome as an explanatory resource for
human traits (especially diseases) marks precisely the transition from the slightly abstract
notion of the genome writ large coming out of the Human Genome Project (HGP) to the
eminently concrete sequences of multitudes of individual genomes, individual not only in the
sense that they come from individual beings but indeed, and increasingly so, from individual
cells of the same being. From cancer (Burrell et al, 2013) to neurodevelopmental disorders
(Poduri et al, 2013) to, indeed, healthy development (De, 2011), next-generation sequencing
has brought the genetic heterogeneity of our cells back to the fore, thereby beginning to
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illuminate the truly unprecedented extent of our somatic mosaicism (that is, of the genetic
differences found among cells of the same organism) and to propose for it an important role in
a variety of conditions. Indeed, in an almost ironic twist, the very technology of epigenetic
reprogramming (which allows to reset the epigenome of individual somatic cells and derive
from them unlimited amounts of pluripotent stem cells which, among other things, greatly
facilitates genome sequencing) is one of the most powerful approaches to probe the depth
of our genomic diversity, both within and among individuals (Takahashi and Yamanaka,
2006; Abyzov et al, 2012). Against the backdrop of these developments, which together
re-emphasize the importance of genomes as explanatory resource, we can then observe how it
is an intersection of two discourses that upholds the bivalent relationship between genomics
and epigenomics that we have recounted above.
On the one hand, to the extent that the admittedly naïve expectations over the immediate
impact of the HGP have not been fully realised, epigenomics has progressed within a new
promissory discourse where its findings are conceptualized as the “key ‘missing piece’ of the
etiological puzzle” and what will make justice of the promises of the now discredited “genocentric
focus in our approach to human disease” (Szyf, 2011). Examples of such a discourse abound and
inform much of the excitement over epigenetics in biomedicine (Feinberg, 2008; Choi and Friso,
2010; Petronis, 2010; Chadwick and O’Connor, 2013; Mill and Heijmans, 2013).
On the other hand, the ability to study both genomes and epigenomes together at
unprecedented resolution has been inviting a different discourse where the former regains
primacy in shaping the latter, from the emphasis on genetic mutations in epigenetic regulators
that underlie an increasing number of diseases (Ronan et al, 2013) to the notion that somatic
genetic mosaicism is not only widespread during development and aging but that it can itself
affect “the epigenetic patterns and levels of gene expression, and ultimately the phenotypes of
cells” (De, 2011). Clearly, depending on how far the pendulum swings toward the poles of
these two discourses, one encounters a range of epistemic nuances, from the mutually
exclusive attempts to replace the genome with the epigenome (or indeed vice versa) as
explanatory resources, to the mutually reinforcing attempts to probe them in the increasingly
visible circularity of their interconnections.
In this respect, and unsurprisingly, twin studies are proving to be an especially informative
domain in which to flesh out the mutual reconfigurations of these two discourses. A source of
permanent wonder throughout human history, twins have come to be a unique challenge and
an equally unique opportunity once some of them ‘became’ monozygotic, that is, once
embryology and genetics led us to trace their identity to the sameness of cellular and genetic
constituents, thus setting them apart from their ‘lesser’ siblings that happened to share only a
womb at a given time (that is, the same context of epigenetic triggers, in today’s language, see
Nowotny and Testa, 2011). The genetic identity of monozygotic twins, cast against the range
of their phenotypic diversity, has thus become the most visible manifestation of the genome’s
insufficiency as sole or even main determinant / predictor for several human traits, offering for
this very reason a unique entry point into the dissection of non-genetic contributions. In its
proposed role of critical intermediate between genotype and phenotype or genotype and
environment (along the many shifts we have encountered above), epigenetics has thus
acquired increasing prominence in twin studies, as witnessed by what is arguably its most
visionary and cogent pursuit, namely the Peri / Postnatal Epigenetics Twin Study with its
systematic and prospective scrutiny of individual epigenetic variation in twin cohorts starting
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from birth (Loke, 2013), that in turn builds on the first systematic scrutiny of the epigenetic
changes that accrue over the lifetime of monozygotic twins (Fraga, 2005).
Against this backdrop, the recent popular science book by Tim Spector, Identically Different
(2012) becomes a powerful example precisely because Spector is both a leading scientist in
twin studies (Professor of Genetic Epidemiology at Kings College and founder of the UK
Twins Registry, one of the largest world collections on twins) and, in this case, a popularizer
of epigenetic findings. The book opens with Spector’s confession, “Until three years ago, I was
one of the many scientists who took the gene-centric view of the universe for granted”, and
proceeds to translate into popular culture the epistemic tensions of epigenetic research in its
quest for the new paradigm that fills in where classic gene-centrism has failed. If twin studies
ground in the genome only 35 per cent of the variance that accounts for a whole range of
psychological and medical traits (Spector, 2012, p. 147), where should one look for the
remaining unexplained variance, Spector’s key argument goes, if not in epigenetics? The point,
however, lies precisely in how that unexplained variance, the analogical vastness of
environmental signals we have recounted above, is being cast within the same digitally
friendly language of maps, codes or blueprints that enabled the gene-centric paradigm to rise
in the first place. Just to quote an example from Spector (2012), the “religious susceptibility
gene” remains steady, in this narrative, in the ambition to ground culturally sophisticated
phenomena onto molecular codes, with the difference that these codes now take the form of
flexible and hence reversible switches rather than fixed circuits (p. 107).
In sum, our conclusion is mixed. If one were to look in epigenetics for a radical disavowal of
the digital primacy of the genetic language, she would be disappointed and might well
conclude, following the famous dictum from the Italian twentieth century masterpiece The
Leopard that “everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same” (Tomasi di
Lampedusa [1958] 1960). If instead one looked in epigenetics for a defiance of genetic
determinism that succeeds precisely by applying the same digital language but to include
rather than to exclude context (environment, biography, lifestyle and so on), then she may
more likely perceive the innovative thrust of the field.
Epigenetic imaginaries
A growing interest in the broader landscape where scientists operate as “cultural producers”
or “sociocultural entrepreneurs” has characterized recent work in the social studies of science
(Fujimura, 2003). The notion of imagination and imaginaries has been employed by several
authors to emphasize the “historically inflected and socioculturally sedimented” context
where scientific knowledge takes shape and “interpolates technical, biomaterial, political-
economic, social, cultural, and ethical elements” (Fortun and Fortun, 2005). The way
scientific discourses are embedded with other cultural discourses and contribute to trigger
the imagination of scientists and society has been analyzed especially in genetics and genomics.
In a slightly different meaning Jasanoff and Kim (2009) have introduced the notion of
sociotechnical imaginaries to emphasize, in the context of a study on nuclear power, the
“promotion and reception of science and technology by non-scientific actors and institutions”
and national differences in “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected
in ( … ) scientific and/or technological projects” (p. 120). It is therefore in this context of
renewed interest toward the imaginative/imaginary context of science that it is possible to
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suggest a third line of reflexive investigation on epigenetic knowledge, what we can name here
the ‘epigenetic imaginaries’.
Epigenetics has shown in just few years to be a powerful imaginative tool. The profound
impact of epigenetics on society and its symbolic landscape is exemplified by the rapid
diffusion within the popular press, in pop science books (Francis, 2011; Carey, 2012)
and documentaries (such as the BBC “Ghost in Your Gene” program or the more recent
“The hidden life of our genes”) of a whole series of new foundational stories that seem to play
the same function as Dora’s case did for Freud, Little Albert for behaviorism and Phineas Gage
has been doing recently for moral neuroscience. These truly “dramatic epigenetic pin ups”
(Davey Smith, 2012) are constantly retold among the wider public to illustrate the social/
historical relevance of epigenetics: from the ‘thrifty phenotype’ of the DOHaD hypothesis to
the impact of the Dutch Hunger Winter (1944–1945) on the lifespan, decades later, of people
prenatally exposed to it (among which, we are told, Audrey Hepburn), from the consequences
of the siege of Leningrad to the transgenerational effects of famine in the remote village of
Overkalix, in North Sweden.
Also the more squarely experimental stories are shaping intensely contemporary imaginary,
becoming true topoi in the genre: it is the case, for instance, of the switching on and off
of the agouti gene in mice (through a methyl-rich maternal diet in gestation) that makes
genetically identical offspring look phenotypically different, in coat color but, more impor-
tantly, in weight and susceptibility to disease (Waterland and Jirtle, 2003, 2004). The passage
on to the second generation of such an effect also has become emblematic of the idea that
not only a mother’s but a grandmother’s diet can have a profound impact on the health of the
grandchildren, an idea popularized in a classic epigenetic slogan such as: “you are what your
grandmother ate” (Pray, 2004). A similar iconic status, especially for its possible implications
for social research, has been reached by Meaney’s (2001b) study on how variations in
maternal behavior of rats alter methylation patterns in the offspring and how these epigenetic
alterations affect the next generation, but can be reversed by cross-fostering the pups to
more “affective mothers”. Along with the study on glucocorticoid receptor and child abuse
(McGowan et al, 2009), this study has been hailed as evidence of how social experience gets
under the skin (Hyman, 2009), and this metaphor has traveled widely in the social science
context and is today reinforced by a parallel notion of epigenetic effects going “into the mind”
(Toyokawa et al, 2012).
Finally, the epigenetic imagination is also about novel metaphorical resources (Nerlich and
Stelmach, 2013). These metaphors are sensibly different from the language that characterized
the genetic landscape. The metaphors of epigenetics are meant to show reversibility where
before there was stability (the ‘pencil’s trait’ that can be erased versus the pen, the epigenetic
software versus the genomic hardware), a variation on the genetic script (epigenetics as the
German umlaut that can change meaning to a word without changing its material succession
of letters (Urnov and Wolffe, 2001), or epigenetics as a removable post-it, a mere annotation
on the genetic script), the persistence of past experiences through generations (“a ghost in the
genes”, a “cellular memory of past events”, a “nuclear time bomb in our genes”, a poison,
a curse, a scar, a mark in the genes) or holistic view of biological processes (epigenetics
as a “symphony” of elements, replacing the absolutist role of the gene as “the director of the
play”, see Noble, 2006; Qiu, 2006; Francis, 2011), but also to reinforce a new language of
programming (fetal programming, environmental and social programming and so on).
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Pathway 2: Epigenetics between fact and concern
A second crucial aspect in the emergence of an ‘epigenetics and society’ research program
concerns the possible political, legal and ethical implications of epigenetic research. Following
in the footsteps of its HGP antecedents, also epigenetics has started to trigger its own share of
studies on Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI).
There can be little doubt as to the relevance of the ELSI studies that were spurred by and within
the HGP, in terms both of what they accomplished directly and of what they set in motion more
broadly for a sociologically minded approach to developments in the life sciences. In this work,
however, we set out a task for ourselves that is clearly distinct from a discussion of the ELSI of
epigenetics and that we hope in fact will be helpful in steering it along innovative directions. The
reason is that, even at its most sophisticated, in its very wording the ELSI idiom reveals deep-
seated assumptions, often unintentional or at any rate unscrutinized, about the flow of innovation
in knowledge-intensive societies. After all, when discussing the ELSI of something, the very
emphasis on the implications of this or that betrays the underlying model in which technoscien-
tific ingenuity precedes (in the softer version) or frankly drives (in the harder flavor) social
innovation. The analytical task is thus parsed from the outset into a neat demarcation of objects:
on the one hand science (whose epistemic nitty gritty is more often than not black boxed), on the
other society (or its many proxies, from laws to publics, from regulations to markets and so on).
This, however, bears little resemblance to what by now four decades of empirical work in
STS have been consistently showing, namely that in technologically complex, knowledge-
intensive societies the actions of epistemic and normative ordering, and their results, are not
only interconnected but indeed mutually constitutive of each other. The idiom of co-
production (Jasanoff, 2004) has captured this symmetrical constitution with particular
cogency, highlighting how, when such settlements are eventually reached, they end up
establishing not only an epistemic but also a normative order. In Latourian terms (Latour,
2004), we thus propose that the second pathway for an emerging social study of epigenetics is
the following: to define how matters of epigenetic fact have already become mobilized as
matters of social concern and, vice versa, how matters of social concern are becoming matters
of epigenetic fact, all the while keeping alert to how, by the same token, also matters of
epigenetic concern can become matters of social fact.
Specifically, we anticipate two prominent directions of this mobilization: (i) the digitization
of the environment, with its attending discourse of collective and individual responsibility,
including the notion of transgenerational accountability; and (ii) the identification of
epigenomically distinct subgroups/subpopulations aiming at objectifying in molecular terms
disadvantageous conditions and/or unequal social structures.
Digitizing the environment: Plasticity, responsibility and purity
The digitization of the environment, and its impact on responsibility, cuts across the main line
of tension in molecular epigenetics, that between stability and reversibility. On the one hand
molecular epigenetics is what promises to unravel genome’s openness to environmental
influences, social factors and the biographical marks of personal experience, making visible
in molecular detail its essence of ‘reactive genome’, following Keller (2011) and more recently
Griffiths and Stotz (2013). Almost by definition, this openness to the environment, in its
broadest sense, invites the expectation of change, the notion that once the genome has been
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downgraded from the high citadel of causal primacy to the messy roundabouts of reactive
developmental resources, biological fates become inherently reversible and porous to inter-
vention. From the massive investment in epigenetic modifiers within drug discovery to the
rising prominence of environmental epigenetics (in the flavor of either blessing or curse), much
of current molecular epigenetics revolves around the promise of change. On the other hand,
however, the more stringent epigenetic phenomena, and those that are triggering more
widespread fascination, are those that typically resist change, those states that defy in their
stability the inherent disruption of genome regulation associated to the cycles of reproduction
in cells or organisms.
Here, the same factors (environmental or else experiential) that promise change are also
those that can leave permanent imprints or even scars. This ambivalence (or more
appropriately: dialectic) is evident in Meaney and colleagues’ groundbreaking studies on the
effects of maternal care on gene expression and neural development in rat pups (Meaney,
2001b; Weaver et al, 2004) that have acquired almost iconic status in the present exploration
of the biosocial link, including a recent expansion of their work to the human brain
(McGowan et al, 2009). These studies reflect this profound line of tension in epigenetic
research, implicit in the very notion of plasticity (Malabou, 2008). The plastic brain and the
plastic genome are those that can give form but also receive form from the outside: you can
change your genes, but also your genes (that is, the way in which they operate) can be
changed, insulted, permanently damaged (or improved) by environmental exposures. It is thus
against the backdrop of this tension between passivity and activity that we can most
productively situate epigenetics’ intellectual program of molecularizing the environment in
digital terms thus making its impact on living beings measurable, archivable and comparable.
Unsurprisingly, this digitizing epistemology, along with the technological frontiers that it
discloses and stimulates, is entering as a powerful resource in a reconfiguration of individual and
collective responsibilities. The increasingly visible plasticity of the epigenome supports the new
postgenomic discourse in which the genome is understood as something malleable that can be
trained and modified through an “extended practice” (Spector, 2012). ‘Practice’ is key here, as it
captures how the potential reversibility of epigenetic marks grounds the rationale for continuous
intervention and/or maintenance that may safeguard their plastic and hence vulnerable states.
Responsibility ensues thus in response to both implications of epigenomic plasticity: (i) on the
one hand frailty and danger, with the call to protect one’s own epigenome from external insults
(be they related to lifestyle, occupational hazards, environmental pollutants and so on); (ii) on the
other opportunity and resource, with the promise to change and improve upon one’s endowment.
This dialectic spans both scholarly and popular literature, as well-illustrated in a recent
Time article where epigenetics is presented to the broad public as bringing “both good news
and bad”, the bad news being the vulnerability of the epigenome to wrong lifestyles (“eating
too much can change the epigenetic marks atop your DNA in ways that cause the genes for
obesity to express themselves too strongly and the genes for longevity to express themselves
too weakly” (Cloud, 2010) and the good news being the newly recognized capacity “to
manipulate epigenetic marks in the lab”, which means that scientists “are developing drugs
that treat illness simply by silencing bad genes and jump-starting good ones”. In all evidence,
what lies ahead, and is already starting to unfold, is a major expansion in the care of the self
along Foucauldian lines (Foucault, 1988) and as concrete examples of this digitizing thrust
begin to emerge, they will constitute a rich palimpsest of options for STS scrutiny.
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In particular, the co-productionist framework will allow to unpack how the processes of
gathering, standardizing and certifying epigenetic evidence will align with political, legal
and economic rationalities in bringing about new settlements (or possibly reinforcing
existing ones) across some of the most persistent dichotomies that structure our reflection
on the human experience: normal versus pathological (or enhanced), safe versus dangerous,
natural versus artificial, individual versus collective.
But if the epigenetic digitization of the environment functions in the spatial reconfiguration
of the body vis a vis various sources of environmental exposure (along with the power
structures within which they materialize), no less momentous is the temporal dimension of its
impact. Indeed, inherent to the very same intellectual project is the notion that the epigenetic
body is at once inhabited by the traces of its past and seeded with traces of its future. And these
traces can stretch not only over one’s own lifetime or over one’s own offspring’s lifetime, but
possibly over the lifetime of several following generations. Indeed, as we saw above, the
transgenerational resilience of epigenetic states, especially when it comes to humans, remains
at once a topic of intense research (including heated controversies) and the magnet of greatest
public fascination through the emphasis on an epigenetically haunted body, as most iconically
captured in the very title of the BBC documentary on epigenetics “Ghost in Your Genes” and
its bold announcement that “The lives of your grandparents – the air they breathed, the food
they ate, even the things they saw, can directly affect you, decades later, despite you never
experiencing these things yourself”.
We see at play, in principle but increasingly also in practice, an expansion of the concept of
responsibility that reaches well beyond the individual and her direct offspring, fostering the
materialization of new bonds among generations. Indeed, precisely this aspect has already
triggered the attention of bioethicists and legal scholars in reassessing the inter-generational
impact of traumatic social events and forecasting how “Epigenetic effects caused by chemicals
and other environmental agents may provide a new source of litigation and liability under the
common law. Such litigation, especially when it involves second and third generation effects,
would raise a number of novel challenges and issues” (Rothstein et al, 2009). What is
interesting here is how the ideas of natural, normal and pure that have shaped the discourse on
the genome as a collective resource in need of protection (as “heritage of humanity”
characterized by a natural state, in UNESCO’s wording) will map upon the epigenome when
it comes to so-called intergenerational equity. We see already glimpses of such a one to one
translation, as in the recommendation that “each generation should maintain the quality of
the human genome and epigenome and pass it on in no worse condition than the present
generation received it” (ibid.).
Yet, it is precisely the very notion of a ‘quality’ of an epigenome that will likely become
the terrain of both scientific and social controversies as we move from the already-
challenging task of defining reference epigenomes as standards for the advancement of the
field (that is, the core mandate of IHEC) to the even greater challenge of accommodating
and indeed interpreting those standards in terms of collective political intervention
(Dupras et al, 2012; Hedlund, 2012). “Each of us has far greater responsibility than we
ever imagined!” claims a popular medical American website (www.drfranklipman.com/
faqs-on-epigenetics/). Indeed, the most visible effect so far of this narrative of hyper-
responsibilization is probably what emerges from the intense moralization of the maternal
body and behaviors in the triangulation of epigenetic and DOHaD writings.
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Epidemiological studies linking the lifestyle (diet, smoking) of boys during puberty with
the disease risk of their grandsons and in general the male line (Pembrey, 2002; Pembrey et
al, 2005) may possibly relieve the pressure on mothers, it has been claimed (Shulevitz,
2012), but the maternal body and her lifestyle remain so far overwhelmingly central
(Richardson, forthcoming) as a target of responsibility for harmful epigenetic conse-
quences on the child’s health.1
Epigenetics in social policy and public health discourses
The second axis of investigation regards the huge expectations placed on epigenetics in
terms of social policy and public health. Biological arguments in social policy have a well-
deserved history of being discredited as ad hoc justifications for natural inequalities, social
hierarchies and the immutability of social structures. These arguments endemically
reappear in the public arena as the recent polemics in the United Kingdom by a
government policy advisor on “Genetics outweighs teaching” illustrates (Wintour, 2013).
Biology keeps being seen as a form of destiny but clearly epigenetics may introduce a
strong discontinuity with this stereotypical thinking. By pointing to a new relationship
between biological and social events, in which the social assumes a causative role in
shaping human biology to a degree unseen before (Landecker and Panofsky, 2013),
molecular epigenetics may produce significant conceptual changes in the applications of
biological findings to social policy strategies.
Indeed, epigenetics is already being used in the service of explaining the persistence,
within specific groups, of long-lasting social/health issues, such as obesity, cardiovascular
disease, mental health, but also poverty, inequalities, neglect and their dysfunctional
perpetuation generation after generation. Kuzawa’s and Sweet’s (2009) study on
race is a very interesting example of this reconfiguration in epigenetic terms of
racial disparities in cardiovascular health in the United States. Here an epigenetic
developmental model of black–white disparities is said to provide “a more parsimonious
explanation than genetics for the persistence of cardiovascular disease disparities between
members of socially imposed racial categories”. For the authors, epigenetics offers “an
important set of mechanisms by which social influences can become embodied,
having durable and even transgenerational influences on the most pressing US health
disparities”(ibid.).
A second key example of a reconfiguration of social disparities in epigenetic terms comes
from the empirical study of McGuinness et al (2012) on the correlation between socio-
economic status and levels of DNA methylation in Glasgow. This study, based on blood
samples of 239 people from Glasgow’s poorest and most affluent areas, found that global
DNA hypomethylation was associated with the most deprived group of participants. The
association between social deprivation and lower levels of methylation (in turn associated
with enhanced inflammatory status and associated disease risk) enabled to posit for
aberrant methylation, and by implication for other epigenetic signatures as well, the
potential as new biomarker of social adversities, neglect and poverty. Local newspapers
1 As Richardson (forthcoming) acutely notes in three of the most classic experimental studies of epigenetic
mechanisms (agouti gene in mice; season’s influence in voles; licking/grooming in rats) the epigenetic
modification is always introduced via the behavior or physiology of the mother.
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greeted this study as “the beginning of an explanation as to why Scotland’s biggest city has
the unwanted title of ‘the sick man of Europe’ ”. Furthermore, charities celebrated the
research as “ ‘startling evidence’ of the impact poverty can have on children before they
have even left the womb, and warned that cutbacks to welfare provision would only worsen
the damage” (Mclaughlin, 2012).
It may be too early to say but, in a near future, it is foreseeable that epigenetic findings
will become increasingly relevant in social policy strategies, and are likely to be positioned
at the crossroads of three axes: (i) first, the use of epigenetic findings to offer an ultimate
bastion of biological evidence for social deprivations and inequalities (Miller, 2010) and
influence specific political agendas (in this reproducing the impact and allure of fMRI
studies in social policy in the last decade: Wastell and White, 2012). (ii) Second, to the
extent that in epigenetic research social adversities, class inequalities and other societal
factors operate through the modification of biological endowments, the deep-seated
distinction between natural and social inequalities that has structured much political
science as well as much policy work will become so visibly blurred so as to be open for a
potentially thorough reframing (Loi et al, 2013). To catch this intellectual novelty a new
hybrid terminology, beyond the nature/nurture divide (Singh, 2012; Nature Editorial,
2012), has already started to appear, from notions of “metabolic ghetto” and “maternal
capital” (Wells, 2010) to “molecular biology of the social position” (Niewöhner, 2011).
(iii) Third, epigenetics may drive the emergence of a discourse that identifies, at the local
level, subgroups/subpopulations with different epigenetic marks (reflecting for instance
their disadvantageous conditions). These potentially vulnerable/risky subpopulations
and ‘permanently undermined’ groups may thus become the target of a new epigenetic
biopolitics. A possible and updated revival of soft or Lamarckian inheritance in social
policy discourses, in which local contexts decisively affect the quality of the epigenome and
traumas travel intergenerationally to become ingrained within a specific population, should
not make us forget that in the past these Lamarckian views of inheritance have become a
fertile terrain for intensely racist and eugenic discourses on, for instance, the irremediable
degeneration of the germ plasm in unfavorable environments (as in the case of the anti-Irish
writings of British Lamarckian eugenicist E.W. MacBride, see Bowler, 1984). Without
implying that this is likely to happen today, social and political scientists need to be aware
of the complex and often subtle nature of the implications that different notions of
biological heredity may have when transferred to policy contexts.
Pathway 3: Paradoxes of somatic materialism
In the last two decades the expansive success of the life sciences, from neuroscience to
epigenetics, has extended its reach over much of what had been once reserved to the perimeter
of ‘nurture’, the vaguely defined but prestigious space where social and cultural influences
were sovereign. Nurture has become today increasingly subject to the techniques of
measurement, digitization and storage that are part of that molecularization of environmental
and societal factors that is foundational to epigenetics’ intellectual program. It is as digital
representations of the environmental, social or biographical aspects of ‘nurture’ that
epigenomic profiles enable the molecular, and at times also experimentally tractable, under-
standing of living beings. Yet, while molecularization has already sparked an important
debate in the social sciences over the last decade (Shostak, 2005; Beck and Niewöhner, 2006;
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Rose, 2007; Nowotny and Testa, 2011), epigenetics seems to herald a new stage that entails
“a highly selective scanning of the socio-material environment in order to make snippets of it
available for experimental work at the molecular level. The sociomaterial environment and
increasingly everyday life itself is framed and ordered in terms of its effect on molecular
processes in the body” (Landecker, 2011; see also Niewöhner, 2011).
The same emergence and contemporary diffusion of a term like “exposome”,2 coined by
epidemiologist Wild (2012) to define “every exposure to which an individual is subjected from
conception to death” although important in rebalancing the focus of medicine toward
environmental factors, is symptomatic of a “certain ontological flattening” as Landecker and
Panofsky (2013) claim, “by which different categories of things in the world are made
equivalent by recasting them as different forms of exposure”. The suffix – ome in exposome
reflects such a digitization of all forms of environmental exposure, from motherly love to
toxins, from food to class inequalities, into a single unifying category and syntax. It is at this
level, we agree with Lock (2012), that “epigenetic findings may well set off a new round of
somatic reductionism because research is largely confined to the molecular level”. It would be
inappropriate, however, to read this novel somatic reductionism as the next episode in a
genealogically linear saga of the rise of modern scientific reductionism. Things are much more
complex and in a way interesting in epigenetic research and the reductionism and materialism
that we are witnessing today may be qualitatively very different from the one driven by
genetics in the last decade of twentieth century.
Specifically, the paradox on which we want to call the attention here is that, differently
from gene-centered twentieth century biology, it is precisely the current unprecedented
deflation and openness to environmental factors of the postgenomic gene, with the subsequent
collapse of the nature/nurture border, to produce this new stage of materialism and somatic
reductionism with its singular profile. Here, there is a two-way movement that is worth
exploring in detail.
On the one side, the more scientists explore the molecular meanderings of the genome,
the more they meet “the many ties that link the individual body and its molecules to the
spatio-temporal contexts within which it dwells”, as Niewöhner (2011) has aptly commen-
ted. Unsurprisingly, this notion that the line between the biological and the social has
been erased to an unprecedented extent has been greeted in the social science and humanities.
Representative of this attitude is an important recent article by Guthman and Mansfield
that celebrates environmental epigenetics as fundamentally undermining “the boundaries
[that are] often taken for granted between what is internal and what is external to the
body, between nature and nurture, and between time and space”. “There is nothing about the
body that forms a solid boundary – or threshold – between it and the external environment”
they claim and “this interchange of environmental and bodily molecules suggests a trans-
formation in what we mean by ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ such that the lines between them are
2 As a National Institute of Environmental Health Science document (http://www.niehs.nih.gov/about/
strategicplan/visionary-ideas/health-status/index.cfm) explains the notion of the exposome “replaces the
chemical-by-chemical approach to finding causes of disease and includes endogenous and exogenous
exposures”. The emphasis on this new concept is evident from the following lines: “Characterizing the
human exposome represents a challenge similar to the HGP, which began when DNA sequencing was in its
infancy”. See also, The Human Exposome Project at humanexposomeproject.com/. Two major grants on
the exposome have been awarded by the EU in 2012.
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being erased” (Guthman and Mansfield, 2013, pp. 12–14). This extreme openness of the
epigenetic body to the world’s signals is certainly a major shift away from the mainstream
lesson of twentieth century biology. The most common view of the body in twentieth century
biology was derived from a Weismannian understanding of it as “a causal dead end”
(Griesemer, 2002) that saw causation going unidirectionally from genotype to phenotype
(otherwise referred to as the hard distinction between soma and germ line). The Weismannian
body found an isomorphic reconstruction in Crick’s (1958) central dogma of molecular
biology, which “states that once ‘information’ has passed into protein it cannot get out again”.
This made the body (that is, the phenotypic level) a mere passive receiver of genetic information
via the protein chain (or a ‘vehicle’ of the genes, as in Dawkins’ (1976) later speculations that
followed the same tradition). Much more in the spirit of ecological traditions, or (if one is
allowed) of the early twentieth century phenomenological notion of the body as embedded in
its vital contexts, the epigenetic body brings the Weismannian body to an end.
On the other side, however, epigenetics’ materialization of novel links between the genetic
and the social, its making the body porous and permeable to the world is exactly the channel
by which the capture of the body in molecular terms is made possible. The openness of the
genome to the social is thus always on the verge of collapsing the social onto a mere source of
differential genetic expression. This dialectic within postgenomic research is implicitly
recognized by philosophers of biology Griffiths and Stotz (2013) (two unambiguous critics
of reductionism) when they write how, in the current postgenomic and epigenetic landscape,
the study of nurture is becoming “potentially as ‘reductionist’ – that is to say, mechanistic – as
research in any other areas of the molecular biosciences” (p. 5). What we want to emphasize
here is the fact that, again with Griffiths and Stotz (2013), “a more epigenetic understanding
of nature” goes together with “a more mechanistic understanding of nurture” and both these
phenomena are a direct consequence of the fact that genes are today postgenomically defined
“by their broader context” (p. 228).
This is the reason why we do not believe that in this context it would make sense simply
to read epigenetics as a climax of the themes of twentieth century genetics. It is possible as
Sarah Richardson claims that in epigenetic research “genes remain very much at the center”
and very likely, as Richardson and Lock have argued, that a novel wave of reductionism
is very much an effect of contemporary epigenetics, but the epistemic sources of this
reductionism are very different from those of late twentieth century reductionism. Whereas
in late twentieth century gene-centrism, from sociobiology onwards, we found an increasing
attempt to expand the reach of nature into the field of nurture, here the somatic reductionism
of epigenetics is the effect of an opposite epistemic claim: that neither nature nor nurture
makes sense anymore, and everything is part of an integrated and blurred nature–nurture
ontogenetic system (Meloni, 2013, 2014). The same notion of mechanism employed
by Griffiths and Stotz has to be understood, following Bechtel (2008), in an integra-
tive, quasi-holistic way as something that “recognizes the importance of the organiza-
tion in which the parts are embedded and the context in which the whole mechanism is
functioning” (p. 21).
Similar paradoxes appear when dealing with epigenetics as “the agent of resolution” (Keller,
2010) of the nature/nurture debate. On the one side molecular epigenetics is certainly a
welcome challenge to the biologically untenable dualism of nature and nurture (Meaney,
2001a, 2010). In Galton’s own terminology, the opposition of nature and nurture was
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supposed to distinguish “what one brings into the world at birth” versus “influences that act
after birth” (Logan and Johnston, 2007). It is clear just from this simple definition how
fallacious this dualism appears today, when we know for instance how several forms of
prenatal exposures have a profound impact on phenotypes in adult life.
On the other side, however, if epigenetics certainly undermines the naïve separation of
nature and nurture, at the same time, in breaking this fragile boundary around which much of
the twentieth century episteme of the social and human sciences was constructed, it brings to
light an entire new set of conceptual problems. To see this more clearly we need to
contextualize epigenetic research in a broader transition in the life sciences that increasingly
incorporates the space of culture into an evolutionary framework.
The collapse of the boundaries between the cultural and the biological was strictly avoided in
a post-Weismannian division of labor between the ‘nature fortress’ and the ‘nurture fortress’,
but is instead very much part of new intellectual trends in biology, from Developmental System
Theory to Niche Construction that have extended biological inheritance so much to include
extragenetic resources such as culture, or the symbolic system. In these trends, culture is not a
biological adaptation in neo-Darwinian sense such as evolutionary psychology, or a meme to be
studied on the fashion of a (narrowly defined) gene-centrism, but something that is taken much
more seriously, as one of the four dimensions of evolution, itself structured as an inheritance
system (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005). We sympathize with this theoretical approach but would
just like to recall that precisely in response to this integrative neo-Lamarckian language the
social sciences reacted in early twentieth century and constructed their autonomous episteme
based on a hard separation of biology and culture (Stocking, 1968; Kroeber, 1917). The novel
epigenetic language of extended extragenetic inheritance is likely therefore to be as provocative
for neo-Darwinism as it will be for the social sciences and the humanities (Meloni, 2014).
Conclusions
That epigenetics heralds a revolution, what we alluded to in the title echoing a recent popular
book (Carey, 2012), has become such a tacitly accepted notion that it has escaped scrutiny
almost entirely. Here we set out to scrutinize the key claims harnessed in support of this
revolutionary narrative, in scientific and lay discourses alike, starting from a brief historical
and epistemological reappraisal of the various strands of epigenetic thinking, often produc-
tively blurred in their distinctions or at times frankly competing with each other.
More than the hyped upheaval promised by popular literature, what emerges from our
analysis is more akin to what Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci (see Gramsci and
Forgacs, 1988) famously referred to in the 1930s as “passive revolution”. According to his
definition a revolution is passive when, far from being a radical break, it unfolds as a long-
term process in which progressive and backward-looking forces coexist and overlap. It is
passive (as in the case of the Italian Risorgimento) because it does not have the strength for (or
may not even aim at) changing ‘the essential’ and ends up thereby proceeding in a sort of
limping way. And yet, despite an uncertain route in which vocal gestures end up often void or
usher into bombastic but sterile statements, its impact can nonetheless prove revolutionary.
Without overdoing the analogy between political theory and science, we think that the
Gramscian framework captures well the ways in which the ambition of molecular epigenetics
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innovates the current discourse on life while remaining loyal to the molecular gaze that has
made it so productive and hence prominent in our society. In a nutshell, we have argued that
that ambition is to tie the regulation of the genome to the digitization of the environment,
bringing into relief the temporal dimension that this link invites (including its most far-
reaching transgenerational instances). We have then proceeded to analyze how the pursuit of
this ambition exposes the most salient lines of tensions of molecular epigenetics (from the
epistemic to the normative), opening entry points for a sociologically minded scrutiny for
which we have proposed three paths of inquiry that will hopefully help structure an early
engagement of social scientists with this still-emergent field of the life sciences.
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